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Introduction
Author’s note: One of the five original defining dimensions of commons as
associations and assemblies has accumulated an extensive evolution as an
idea. It has changed more than any of the other four defining characteristics.
It was originally borrowed from Moses Finlay’s Greek term philia (1974;
1999), and termed mutuality (Lohmann, 1992), one of the basic defining
characteristics of commons. It was later relabeled social capital (Lohmann,
2015) to link it with recent work under that label and re-defined as an
emergent characteristic that may or may not be present in commons when
founded, but which is likely to emerge as they develop and evolve. This
manuscript is one part of that conceptual evolution, and retains the term
mutuality, as originally written.
Despite a vast outpouring of work, social researchers and practitioners
interested in nonprofit, voluntary action and philanthropic studies have
generally been reluctant to confront or even acknowledge a number of
important recent issues and developments in social theory and philosophy.
(One important exception is Bruce Sievers’ Civil Society, Philanthropy and
the Commons (2010), which examines closely the work of Spinoza and other
17th century Dutch theorists, while casting only a cursory glance at
contemporary work.
A case in point is the almost complete absence in the third sector
literature of any consideration of the work of John Rawls, whose Theory of
Justice (1971) has sparked much discussion and debate elsewhere during the
past two decades. Not only Rawls, but the large body of work arising in
reaction to his theory – including the communitarianism which is the concern
of this paper – have had little impact.
Of all of the issues and trends which might be mentioned one of the
most interesting and provocative is the resurgence of interest in community
arising theoretically in reaction to Rawls' groundings of his theory of justice
in individualism and pragmatically to the demise of public or mixed economy
liberalism in the face of a coalition of free-market liberalism and religiouslybased conservatism. (Lowi, 1969; 1995) As the original title of this paper
suggests, the nature of community is of central importance to the commons
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theory of voluntary action. Communitarianism is evolving into a large and
complex movement in contemporary social theory and practice. It has been
called ‘the central political debate in Anglo-American political theory’ (Okin,
in Bell, p. 2) Yet only a very small body of third sector work has seriously
confronted the importance of communitarian ideas. (Van Til, 1994; McNutt,
1994). The communitarian label has been applied to many different themes
and ideas, some nostalgic and some novel: among others, the list includes
various 19th century collectivisms and socialisms; Tönnies' gemeinschaft;
progressivism, New Deal liberalism, and more.
In order to properly assess the role of communitarianism, therefore, it
will be necessary to sort out some of these competing and conflicting claims.
My general purpose is to explore the topic of communitarianism and some of
its possible implications for research and practice in the third sector.

The Problem of Mutuality
This paper addresses one centrally important issue: the implications of
communitarianism for the problem of mutuality. Of all the dimensions of the
commons, the most interesting and provocative in light of the communitarian
interest is that which I have called mutuality. (Lohmann, 1992, pp. 58-64)
The problem may be stated quite simply: What is the nature of the bonds
among participants in nonprofit organizations and voluntary action, and
between philanthropic givers and recipients, and how do these affect the
behavior of third sector actors and those in other sectors? Closely associated
with this is the normative question which undergirds practice: How do such
bonds temper the ways in which societies should be organized and governed
to promote the growth of human freedom and opportunity? Thus, mutuality,
offers a rubric within which to consider a host of interesting theoretical and
practical problems. It appears, for example, that mutuality cannot be a
willed, legislated or mandated characteristic of even the most voluntary of
associations. Mutuality is also closely implicated in Tocqueville's
intermediate institutions perspective and the power of association to protect
individuals from state coercion.

Mutuality and Political Theory
Mutuality, and the regard which co-participants develop for one another is
the source of the protective power of association. Mutuality, in other words,
accounts for the peculiar intermediary bulwark which offers a primary
protection of the individual from the state. Except through Tocqueville,
mutuality has had very little impact on American legal and political
philosophy until quite recently. Both approaches have generally been in
thrall to a philosophical individualism which views citizens as autonomous
social atoms and reduces institutions and organizations to the status of
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fictive individuals or to mental images. For a very long time, political
philosophy has rebounded between this individualism at one extreme and the
collectivisms of Marx and other socialists at the other, with little or no
concern for intermediate relations other than those based in pure calculation.
Libertarians and other liberal individualists have consistently seen only
threats to personal freedom and an open society in forms of cooperation or
association implying mutual relations. Some of these threats were real,
others purely imaginary. Thus, one of the questions inevitably raised by
communitarianism is whether it is merely another form of collectivism? A
second, equally important question, however, is whether all forms of
mutuality can be satisfactorily dissolved into either individual self-interest or
collectivism. Conversely, does communitarianism contain elements of some
third perspective? Before we can attempt to deal with that or other issues,
however, we need to examine the question of what communitarianism is or
consists of?

Three Communitarianisms
There are several distinct major forms of communitarianism in
existence today which yield a variety of insights on this matter. We might
call these movement communitarianism; reluctant communitarianism; and
justice communitarianism.

Movement Communitarianism
Movement communitarianism is the phenomenon that Van Til looked
at in his recent ARNOVA paper. (Van Til, 1994) It is probably the most
widely known form of communitarianism and has had the most evident
impact on American public life and policy. It may also be the most
problematic theoretically. It was largely in response to movement
communitarianism that President Clinton declared himself a communitarian
in the 1992 presidential campaign, and it was presumably in response to the
failure of that phrase to ignite much interest among voters that he remained
silent on the question as President and since. Perhaps the word is simply too
long, esoteric and academic sounding to carry much weight in contemporary
politics, where ‘dumbing down’ issues is a much more popular and effective
strategy than appealing to anyone’s intellect. Movement communitarianism
has thus remained largely an effort by a network of social researchers, policy
analysts, lawyers and other academics and intellectuals to foster a centrist
political movement in reaction to the collapse of socialism, the rise of
religious conservatism and the collapse of New Deal liberalism and welfare
state ideologies generally.
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Reluctant Communitarianism
In sharp contrast to the movement communitarians who have eagerly
sought to embrace the communitarian label another group of academic moral
and political philosophers who have actively sought to distance themselves
from the communitarian label, but who have nonetheless had it thrust upon
them by others (and occasionally one another).
One of the least plausible communitarian of all is Alasdair MacIntyre,
a moral philosopher whose principal concern in two major books seem to be
the moral .ailure of modern philosophy, and his strong belief in the
continuing relevance of Aristotle and Aquinas in the modern world.
(MacIntyre, 1981; 1988) MacIntyre's primary argument, in Whose Justice?
Which Rationality? (1988), for example, is that Aristotle did not locate
reason and justice transcendentally, but in a particular social, political and
historical site – the polis. While the implications of that are pretty
straightforward, MacIntyre never really touches on them. In fact, there is
little evidence in his work of any practical concern for contemporary issues
or problems of a non-theoretical sort. He is a classicist who evidences a
considerable distaste for virtually the entire modern world in his writings.
A second equally implausible communitarian is the Canadian moral
and political philosopher Charles Taylor. Taylor's affinities to the kind of
communitarianism represented by Etzioni are more evident than
MacIntyre’s, especially in light of his long involvement and writing against
the separatist movement in his native Quebec. However, his reading of
religion in public affairs, in particular, is dramatically different from
Etzioni’s. (Tully, 1994)

Justice Communitarianism
Much of the contemporary interest in communitarianism was touched off
in reaction to John Rawls, Theory of Justice (1971). Bell (1993) notes that
prior to Rawls, there were two principal objections among political theorists
to arguments for liberalism: The "libertarian objection" was that grounding
liberal theory in utilitarianism opens the possibility of sacrificing some
people's rights for the good of others. At the same time, the "leftist objection"
was that liberal ideology may only be a defense of rule by the upper classes
to protect the interests of property.
Rawls sought to transcend both of these criticisms and reinvigorate
liberalism by shifting the justification for freedom away from utility (where
it has largely rested since John Stuart Mill) to self-determination, thus
opening up a common front with civic republicanism. Humans, he argued,
have a 'highest order' interest (and responsibility) in making and revising
our own life plans and respecting the life plans of others. This was also the
basis of his conclusion that no individual 'deserves' her natural assets and
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thus liberal equality requires partial compensation for unequal distribution
of talents and abilities. This argument, in the larger context, undergirded
Rawl’s famous twin principles of justice.
The Etzioni communitarian concern over the balance of rights and
responsibilities is, in fact, largely addressed by the basic Rawlsian
argument. Rawls has precisely stated pairs of offsetting rights and
responsibilities of a very fundamental sort: People have a responsibility to
recognize their own highest order interests and to recognize the highest
order interests of others. (Which together might be called the "enlightenment
interests" of self and other). They also have a responsibility as reasonable
beings living under social conditions to recognize the need to compensate
others (and to be compensated in turn) for inequalities in the basic social
structure. (Which together can be termed the "emancipatory interests.")
Thus, a balance of rights and responsibilities is, in fact, fundamental to the
Rawlsian liberal perspective. In this way, Etzioni and others affiliated with
the communitarian movement and the journal called The Responsive
Community thus come off as Rawlsian liberals in their approach, however
much they might wish to correct or separate themselves from such
liberalism.
Much the same may be said of the work of Michael Sandel where we
find what is, in many respects, the essence of the communitarian critique as
it relates to mutuality: (Bell, 4-8) Liberalism (including, in Sandel's view,
both John Stuart Mills and Rawls) rests on an overly individualistic
conception of self. (Many of the same themes are of interest to Taylor, as
they were earlier for Hegel and the early American Pragmatists Dewey and
Mead, both of who were influenced by Hegel). Social contract approaches of
interest coalitions substitute for any genuine mutuality in a strong (selfother) sense. (Sandel, pp. 147-183)
The essence of Sandel's critique of Rawls is his statement that Rawls'
principles of justice, however meritorious they may be, cannot be sustained
by his theory of community. In his discussion of "the idea of social union"
(section 79) Rawls distinguishes two equally individualistic senses of the
'good of community' (which might in our terms also be relabeled the value or
importance of mutuality). (Sandel, 148-149) In the first sense, Rawls says,
individuals regard social arrangements as a necessary burden and cooperate
only for the sake of joint pursuit of their individual ends. Sandel calls this
the instrumental model of community. In the second sense, which Rawls
prefers, individuals may share certain 'final ends' and view a scheme of
cooperation as good in itself. Sandel calls this the sentimental model of
community. Neither the instrumental or sentimental views is "capable of
relaxing the bounds between the self and the other without producing a
radically situated self."
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Intersubjectivity, in short, is officially rejected by Rawls, in the reading
of Sandel. Yet, Sandel argues, the theory of justice “depends ultimately for
its coherence on precisely the intersubjective dimension (Rawls) officially
rejects.” The theory relies on concepts like common assets, shared fate,
social union, communities in which individual members 'participate in one
another's nature', and whereby the 'self is realized in the activities of many
selves'. (Sandel, 150-151)
On the basis of this critique, Sandel sets out to fashion a substitute for
both of the Rawlsian individualistic alternatives; a “constitutive” model of
community in which the self is empowered to participate in the constitution
of its identity. It is in this project that he earns (and acknowledges) his
designation as a communitarian. It is also this project where some of the
greatest importance of Sandel’s brand of communitarianism for nonprofit
organizations, voluntary associations and philanthropy is found. It is
important to recognize, therefore, the way in which he utilizes what we are
calling mutuality to make his point that an interactive self (as that notion is
recognized by social psychologists) in a constitutive community is not only
characterized by calculation and choice, but also by reflection, selfawareness, self-understanding and creation and management of a personal
identity.
Sandel's model of "constitutive community" was further developed by
Daniel Bell (1994) who uses the devise of the dialogue to make the at times
obtuse arguments of the communitarians more accessible to a wider
audience. In dialogue, Bell’s characters distinguish three principal forms of
constitutive community, all of which are important for stimulating or
enabling the mutuality of the commons: communities of place, (e.g.,
religious places, campuses, clubs, lodges and meeting halls, spatial
commons); communities of memory (e.g., disciplines and sciences, libraries,
archives, museums, galleries and other collections); and psychological
communities – which Bellah, et. al., (1985) call "lifestyle enclaves" – (e.g.,
cults, alternative communities, utopian communities). We might also see
these, following Hirschman (1970) as communities of consent, in which
mutuality may invoke either loyalty or voice anchored, not in place or
memory, but in willingness to remain engaged.
Not all those labeled communitarians are as content as MacIntyre,
Taylor and Sandel with traditional styles of philosophical argument or
rational methods. Michael Walzer (1983) sought to dismiss entirely the
classical tradition of political argument to which Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin,
Sandel and others remained committed. He advocates overturning the
traditional universal-cognitive approach of philosophy and embraces a
unique form of pragmatic communitarianism: Instead of devising principles
of moral and political conduct from a universal perspective, Walzer argues,
we are better served if we stay rooted in the traditions of our communities,
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interpreting to our fellow citizens the perspectives we share. In light of
Sandel’s three types of communities, we might embrace and actually go
beyond Walzer in noting that such localism can be applied equally not only
to communities of place, but also communities of memory and consent.
Interestingly, through the lens refracted by Walzer the NeoScholasticism of MacIntyre's embrace of Aristotle and his seemingly
ethnocentric embrace of the Scottish moralists give powerful new meanings
to his conclusion that justice and reason are always local, rooted and
sectarian. In this context, the communitarian criticism that liberal
universalism is insufficiently sensitive to the importance of community or
social context (particularity) begins to reveal some very interesting third
sector implications. I have tried to work out the importance of some of these
implications for nonprofit organizations and voluntary action and
philanthropy in the Theory of the Commons. (see especially pp. 53-54 and
pp. 260-262) Eugene Genovese's (1995) reinterpretation of Southern
conservatism offers a perspective that is also compatible with MacIntyre and
Walzer. In the case of associations, perhaps the most profound implication is
the futility of the search for universal ‘best practices’, and other
organizational norms. The implication here is that this is a matter to be
settled ultimately only by the members themselves.
The reluctant communitarians, in particular, have provoked a series of
sharp responses from a large number of critics and commentators, most
seeking to defend liberal individualism against what they see as new forms
of collectivism and oppression.
Derek Phillips critiqued communitarianism, as represented by
MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel, and the group-authored Habits of the Heart, in
terms of what he perceives as a desire to return to some past “golden age” of
community. If such a golden age of community never existed, for example in
colonial America, medieval Europe and ancient Greece then he suggested,
the aspirations of communitarianism must be seen as empty and misguided.

Conclusion
In so far as it has importance for the third sector, communitarianism
must be seen through its attempts to take adequate account of the problem of
mutuality. Many of the issues, particularly those concerning the definition of
self, dealt with by the communitarians are old and familiar ones in pragmatic
philosophy and social science. Mutuality is a principal concern of some
communitarians, particularly Taylor, Sandel and Bell. Constitutive
communities of place, memory, commitment, and perhaps others are
deserving of much consideration by third sector researchers, practitioners
and theorists.
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Whatever else may be said, to interpret communitarianism as merely a
new form of collectivism, as Phillips and other liberal individualists do,
misses the point by failing to acknowledge intersubjectivity, interaction and
socialization in creating and sustaining the individual person. This would
become more clear if communitarians were to address more directly the
manner in which the intermediate institutions of community engender
identity and mutuality even as they buffer individuals from state coercion.
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